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FOREWORD

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITYt
JOHN

H. ROBINSON*

The phrase' "corporate social responsibility" falls trippingly from the tongue, especially in moralistic harangue, but
that same phrase has proven remarkably resistant to definitive ethical analysis or practical application. Perhaps by
breaking the phrase down into its constituent parts we can
discover the causes of the difficulties it poses and set the
scene for the articles that make up this symposium issue.
First, then, "social responsibility." If it were the case that
quite independently of the "corporate" qualifier we had a
widely-shared and well-grounded sense of what social responsibility amounted to, we would have a fairly easy time of it
when that qualifier was added. In fact, however, we lack both
unanimity and clarity in our thinking on social responsibility.
We might usefully, if crudely, characterize that thinking as
caught between two conflicting modes of analysis: the one
minimalist, the other maximalist.
On the minimalist account, each of us is obligated individually (and all of us collectively) to refrain from harming
others just so long as they accord us the same kind of basic
respect. Beyond that we are responsible only for our own dependents and only to those whom we have somehow harmed
by our conduct. We are, of course, free to assist others in
distress, but we are not required to do so. What we do for
them is, on this account, a matter of supererogation, not a
constituent part of our social responsibility.
The maximalist account is at war with its minimalist
counterpart. According to this account, we are obligated to
regard each member of our current generation (and perhaps
also the members of future generations) as persons for whose
well-being we each have some responsibility. Moral failure at1 The Center gratefully acknowledges Professor Robinson's efforts in
organizing this symposium.
* Assistant Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Notre
Dame.
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tends each instance of indifference to the suffering of others
even when the indifferent party was in no sense the cause of
the suffering party's misery. Our social responsibility, on this
account, is practically boundless, as in the real world there is,
and there has apparently always been, such an overwhelming
surplus of misery relative to the resources and imagination of
the few who in their affluence might conceivably mitigate
that misery that only a certain kind of saint might be said to
have discharged the debt that his or her social responsibility
entails.
The two accounts employ radically conflicting imagery
and appeal to equally conflicting basic beliefs for whatever
normative ground they attempt to provide for themselves.
The imagery of the minimalist account is of persons as independent sovereigns entering into those compacts with other
equally independent sovereign persons as to them seem mutually advantageous. The imagery of the maximalist account
is of persons as interdependent family members each inextricably bound to all others by bonds that cannot be severed
without doing moral injury to the one doing the severing.
Minimalists ground their account in the philosophical tradition that stems from Hobbes and Locke. Maximalists ground
theirs in the religious tradition of the Old Testament
prophets and of the synoptic Gospels, although
Schopenhauer in the nineteenth century and Rawls in the
twentieth have both proposed ways of grounding maximalist
accounts that in no significant way rely on the moral insights
implicit in the Judeo-Christian tradition.
The real world is, of course, vastly more complex than
either the image of sovereignty or that of family can express.
Furthermore, the world has been so badly served by literal
sovereigns that one could well wonder why we would want to
people it with billions of quasi-sovereigns, and the implications of family are so extensive, suggesting both paternalism
and fixidness in an inescapable web of particular relations,
that one might well be loathe to take that metaphor too literally either. Even if one were inclined to commit himself or
herself to one of the two extreme accounts, good questions
regarding how this might be done would remain. Do we help
the indigent to become sovereign with respect to their own
lives by declaring them to be sovereign, or does it remain
true that necessitous men are not free men, that real people
often have no choice but to accept conditions that no one
should be required to accept? Does commitment to the ideal
sovereignty of each person entail anything with regard to a
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social responsibility to see that the material preconditions of
genuine freedom of choice are met? Similarly with respect to
the maximalist account, we would need to know how to
render the family imagery operational, how to reconcile its
implicit requirement that the affluent virtually impoverish
themselves so long as real destitution exists in the world with
our competing sense that that represents altruism gone berserk, how to confer some analytic utility upon a notion so
prey to sentimental abuse, and so on.
Where both extreme positions are so manifestly questionable, one might expect a position that mediates between
the two extremes to emerge, but-from the vantage point of
this observer at least-none has. Our scholars, like our culture, live in the tension created by our partial, half-conscious
commitment to both accounts, and as a result we are sure
that we have some social responsibility to the children now
starving in the Sudan even if their death is none of our doing, but no clear idea of what that responsibility amounts to
and no way of establishing that it exists, even for that part of
ourselves that calls our certainty on this point into question.
If "social responsibility" is problematic, "corporate" is
more so. Sometimes the term functions as a synonym for
"business," and even then it complicates the initial problem
of social responsibility enormously. Sometimes, however, it
serves to distinguish one form of doing business, the corporate form, from sole proprietorships and from other forms of
business association, and then it raises a host of new and
mind-boggling problems. The complexity introduced by
"corporate" even in its "business" guise flows from the belief
that, whatever may be the case when we consider ourselves
simply as persons, we have a different and diminished form of
social responsibility when we act in a business capacity. If we
imagine social responsibility to be a kind of external restraint
imposed upon our otherwise uninhibited freedom to do as we
like just so long as we respect the freedom of others, we will
be inclined both to take seriously suggestions that that burden can be made less onerous and to hope for their success.
If, however, we envision the relationship between the self
and the requirements of morality in a radically different fashion, then both the possibility and the desirability of a "business-world" diminution of social responsibility become highly
suspect.
That different fashion of relating the self to ethics perceives moral obligations not as external to the self, limiting
its otherwise ecstatic freedom to be as it chooses, but as inter-
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nal to it, specifying somewhat schematically the kinds of action that are essential to human fulfillment. On this account
fidelity, veracity, sincerity, courage, empathy and the rest are
not burdens to be shirked; they are instead some of the ingredients of human flourishing. If the business world were in
fact founded on premises overtly hostile to these virtues, then
it-like crime-would simply be another form of life that we
would be morally obligated to avoid. But the claim that the
business world is especially hostile to the moral development
of those who participate in it is surely open to serious question. At the very least it presupposes an extremely dubious
notion of the sort of resistance that other arenas of human
interaction (the family, the academy, even the monastery) offer to the emergence of morally decent persons.
When "corporate" operates literally as a modifier of "social responsibility," matters become more complicated than
when that phrase goes unmodified or when "corporate" really means "business." The corporate form of doing business,
especially in its contemporary incarnation, regularly involves
the separation of ownership from control, such that the managers of corporate entities put the assets of people other than
themselves at risk when they make corporate decisions. The
implications of this fact for the ethical analysis of corporate
social responsibility are far-reaching.
If a private individual incurs an expense or forgoes a
gain because of a fallible belief that a more demanding morality than the minimalist one described above requires such
self-denial, that is in some important sense his or her own
affair, and in the ordinary case no harm is done even if it
should appear that the belief that motivated the decision was
in fact a mistaken one. The analysis changes, however, when
that same person makes the same sort of decision relative to
somebody else's expenses incurred and profits forgone, especially where the other person has in the first place entrusted
his or her assets to that individual with a view toward a maximized return. But just how the analysis changes and what results it should produce is a matter that has proven terribly
difficult to resolve.
Where the stockholder and the corporate manager share
a minimalist approach to social responsibility, the problem of
corporate social responsibility can easily be avoided simply
because problematic cases are unlikely to arise for either of
them. But this is mere avoidance and no solution for as long
as the moral acceptability of the minimalist account remains
in doubt. If neither investor nor manager is entitled to limit
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social responsibility as severely as the minimalist account requires, then the fact that they measure their conduct by its
demands becomes a matter of slight moral relevance. Where
the manager has in his or her personal capacity a more capacious notion of social responsibility than that captured by the
minimalist account, and where the manager has no way of
knowing what beliefs characterize current stockholders in the
firm, as is ordinarily the case with large publicly-held corporations, the manager is in a genuine dilemma. Should he or
she assume the correctness of a more maximalist position and
act accordingly despite the fallibility of the reasoning that underlies that position and despite the possibility that it is not
held by the stockholders? Or should he or she act on the least
demanding ethic that could be attributed to minimally decent
stockholders? The first option risks a kind of moral paternalism, the latter a kind of moral nihilism, both of which any
manager should strive to avoid.
The preceding paragraphs touch on only a few of the
many hard questions that any discussion of corporate social
responsibility must face. Perhaps, however, these paragraphs
give the reader a sense of the importance of the issue as well
as of its difficulty. Perhaps also they will function as a sort of
perimeter-setting introduction to the several articles that constitute this symposium.
The symposium begins with Judge John Noonan's summary of the magisterial study of bribery that he published in
book form two years ago. Judge Noonan traces the steps by
which bribery has come to be recognized as an evil. He finds
in our religious tradition an emergent sense that there are
some goods-salvation and justice, for example-that cannot
be trafficked in without their being debased. He finds in our
literary tradition a parallel sense that the attempt to traffic in
these goods debases the trafficker as well. He then shows
how, beginning with Bacon's conviction in 1621, AngloAmerican legal thinking gradually generalized and enforced
the prohibition against bribery.
Judge Noonan's essay is the first in this symposium for
this reason: it powerfully reminds the reader both that the
morality of human practices is subject to reasoned examination-that the moral insight of a person or of an epoch can
be both flawed and shown to be flawed-and that even in the
business world a person becomes what he or she does. If a
course of conduct leaves people furtive and grasping, oblivious to trusts that others have put in them, then that course of
conduct is subject to moral condemnation, even if "every-
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body does it." The relevance of these points to the overall
symposium should become clear once our other contributions
have been sketched.
The second article in the symposium is Professor Kathleen Brickey's study of corporate liability for criminal homicide. In this article Professor Brickey uses a recent Illinois
case as a springboard for an argument that there is a legitimate role for using the criminal process to police life-threatening corporate conduct. In her article she offers several
quite practical reasons for believing that the policing of the
workplace should not be left solely to the limited resources of
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, but she
at no point calls into question the political legitimacy of that
organization's existence. In fact she appears to assume it and
to hope that OSHA will some day have the resources adequately to police the workplace in the interest of enhanced
worker well-being.
In his article, Professor Tibor Machan proffers a diametrically opposed assessment of the value and legitimacy of
OSHA, arguing that both in theory and in practice the sort
of regulation that Professor Brickey would have OSHA engage in is indefensible. Its theoretical indefensibility, Machan
says, can be traced back to the absolute nature of property
rights and to the role that, in his judgment, the state should
play relative to their vindication. Its practical indefensibility
stems from the deterrent effect that he sees such regulation
having on the propensity of workers to fashion those organizational and litigational initiatives of their own of the workplace as would make the need for governmental regulation
unnecessary. The perceptive reader will have little difficulty
locating Professor Machan on the minimalist-maximalist
continuum described earlier in this Foreword.
The fourth contribution is from Professor Kenneth
Goodpaster, a philosopher whose specialty is the normative
analysis of corporate business practices. From his close inspection of several large corporations he has concluded that
we miss an entire normative dimension of corporate life if we
focus on corporations solely as moral agents while overlooking their status as moral environments. That is to say that
internal to each corporation is its particular ethos or normative climate. Some encourage ruthlessness and callous disregard for everything but the bottom line; others accept the
requirements of respect for others but treat those requirements as external constraints on profit-maximization; others
internalize the duty of respect and make conscious efforts to
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square it with enlightened corporate self-interest. In his essay
Professor Goodpaster explores the different ways in which a
corporate ethos is sustained and transmitted, devoting particular attention to how corporate leaders can avoid what he
calls "moral imperialism" in their efforts to inculcate a certain attitude towards the public in their mid-level operatives.
In the final lead article of this symposium, Professors Peter Asch and Rosalind Seneca call into question the very idea
of corporate social responsibility as a way of reducing such
undesirable market outcomes as air pollution and unsafe
products. They argue that the companies that take exhortations to corporate social responsibility seriously risk losing
out competitively to less responsible competitors, and that
even those responsible firms that win out competitively are
unable to legitimize their allegedly responsible conduct in
ways that government regulators can simply because the former lack the political accountability that, indirectly at least,
the latter possess.
This symposium also features two student essays. First,
James Carr surveys existing private and governmental programs which allow a working parent to remain at home with
a newborn infant and proposes amendments to currently
pending federal legislation to create a paid federal parental
leave policy. Second, Kristin Tomonto evaluates Professor
Martin Weitzman's "share economy" proposal to eliminate
stagflation in the economy and recommends a sha"re system
stock option to make implementation of the proposal more
effective.
Taken together, the seven articles that constitute this
symposium display the variety, the complexity, and the importance of the issue of corporate social responsibility. It
might appear to be a defect of the symposium that its several
constitutent parts do not share a common set of background
assumptions regarding the content of that responsibility or
regarding the role of the state in making sure that corporations fulfill their social obligations. The demand for consensus on such matters, however, manifests a profound misunderstanding of the value and limits of moral inquiry.
Consensus is, of course, desirable and in some cases it may
even be achievable. But its absence is not indicative of the
futility of the entire enterprise. All it may mean is that we
have stumbled upon a question that reveals to us how much
tension there is among the beliefs on which we are inclined
to base our moral reflection. Nothing could be more healthy
than for us to focus upon that tension, inquire into its causes,
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and ask ourselves about the extent to which it might profitably be resolved. If the articles in this symposium succeed in
stimulating that sort of inquiry, they will have served their
purpose.

